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The authcT explains that in re~ent court 
opinions and commentaries concerning whether 
punitive damages are taxable, considerable 
weight has been given to a negative Inference that 
appears to lurk in a 1989 amendment to the 
relevant code provision, section 104(a)(2). To the 
contrary, he atglJ.es, the legislative history of that 
amendment and the form that the bill had when 
it was reported out of the Conference Committee 
establish be}'ond doubt that no such inference is 
warranted. 
Since the adoption in 1919 of the Revenue Act of 
1918, the statutory tax law has expressly excluded from 
gross income damages received on account of a per-
sonal injury or sickness. This statutory provision cur-
rently is set forth at section 104{a){2) of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986. The exclusion from income does 
not apply to the extent that the payment constitutes a 
reimbursement for medical expenses for which the tax-
payer previously had been allowed a tax deduction. 
Prior to 1975, the IRS commissioner asserted that the 
statutory exclusion for damages received on account 
of a personal injury does not prevent the taxation of 
punitive damages even when received as part of an 
award or a settlement of a claim for personal injury. 
While the commissioner departed from that view in the 
period between 1975 and 1984, she returned to her 
original position in 1984.1 The Tax Court and the Sixth 
Circuit, however, maintain that all damages received 
in connection with a personal injury claim, i~cluding 
punitive damages, are excluded from gross income by 
section 104(a)(2).2 Three of the four circuit courts of 
'Rev. Rul. 75-45, 1975--1C.B.47, revoked by Rev. Rul. 84-108, 
1~84-2 C.B. 32. 
2Miller v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 330 (1989) (reviewed by the 
coutt), rev'd sub nom. Commissioner v. Miller, 914 F.2d 586 (4th 
Cir. 1990); Horton 'D. Commissioner, __ F.3d __ (6th Cir. 
1994) (divided decision), affg 100 T.C. 93 (1993) (reviewed by 
the court}. 
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appeals (the Fourth, Ninth, and Federal Circuits)3 that 
have passed on this issue at the date of this writing have 
held that punitive damages are included in gross income; 
but trial courts have divided on this issue. The Sixth 
Circuit has excluded punitive damages from income, and 
appeals are pending in two other circuit courts of appeals. 
The question of whether punitive damages should 
be excluded from income will continue to be litigated 
in the immediate future. The issue has been fueled by 
the Supreme Court's 1992 decision in United States v. 
Burke,4 and by the amendment to section 104(a) that 
was adopted in 1989. In the soon to be published ar-
ticle, "Compensatory and Punitive Damages for a Per-
sonal Injury: To Tax or Not To Tax?" the author has 
examined the current tax treatment of both punitive 
and compensatory damages, has criticized the stan-
dards adopted by the Supreme Court in Burke for deter-
mining whether damages are excludable, and has made 
suggestionf:: as to the proper standards for applying the 
statutory exclusion from income. This article addresses 
a more modest topic - namely, the proper construction 
of the last sentence of section 104(a). 
I The question of whether punitive damages should be excluded from Income will continue to be litigated In the Immediate future. 
In 1989, Congress amended section 104(a} by adding 
the last sentence of that provision.5 The last sentence 
reads: 
Paragraph (2) [i.e., section 104(a)(2)] shall not 
apply to any punitive damages in connection 
with a case not involving physical injury or 
physical sickness. 
Subject to transitional rules, punitive damages (or 
settlements in lieu thereof) that are received after July 
10, 1989, in cases of nonphysical injuries, will be tax-
3Commissioner v. Miller, 914 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1990); Hawkins 
D. United States, __ F.3d __ (9th Cir. 1994) (divided 
decision); Reese v. Commissioner,_ F.3d_ (Fed. Cir.1994). 
Contra, Horton v. Commissioner, __ F.3d __ (6th Cir. 1994) 
(divided decision). 
'504 U.S. --.J 112 S.Ct. 1827 (1992). 
5Pub. Law 101-239, section 7641, 103 Stat. 2379 (1989). 
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able. Thus, punitive damages received in cases involv-
ing discriminatory practices or defamation or other 
dignitary torts will be taxable. That will eliminate 
much of the current controversy, but several important 
issues remain. 
First, what will be the tax treatment of punitive 
damages that are received in a case in which there has 
been a physical injury? The 1989 amendment, which 
precludes the application of section 104(a)(2) when 
there is not a physical injury, creates a negative in-
ference that section 104(a)(2) does apply to punitive 
damages when there is a physical injury. However, care 
should be taken as to whether a negative inference is 
warranted. As will be shown below, an examination of 
the legislative history of the 1989 amendment Jearly 
establishes that Congress had no intention of passing 
on the proper treatment of punitive damages in any 
circumstance other than when there was no physical 
injury. 
Second, does the adoption of the 1989 amendment 
demonstrate that Congress believed that the pre-1989 
law excluded punitive damages from income when 
received pursuant to a claim for a personal injury? 
Even if the amendment does indicate that Congress 
held that belief, what weight should the courts accord 
to it? 
Let us first consider the effect of the amendment on 
post-1989 punitive damages obtained in a case involv-
ing a physical injury. While no case has yet arisen in 
which punitive damages for a physical injury were 
received after July 10, 1989, several courts, including 
the Supreme Court, have assumed that the negative 
inference of the amendment's language is valid. For 
exalilple, in footnote 6 of the Supreme Court's decision 
in United States v. Burke,6 the Court stated: 
Congress' 1989 amendment to section 1 04(a)(2) 
provides further support for the notion that "per-
sonal injuries" includes physical as well as non-
physical injuries. Congress rejected a bill that 
would. have limited the section 104(a)(2) ex-
clusion to cases involving "physical injury or 
physical sickness." See H.R. Rep. No. 101-247, pp. 
1354-1355 (describing proposed section 11641 of 
H.R. 3299, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989)). At the 
same time, Conpess amended section 104(a) to allow 
the exclusion of punitive damages only in cases in-
volving "physical injury or physical sickness." [Em-
phasis added.] .... The adoption of this limited 
amendment addressing only punitive damages 
shows that Congress assumed that other damages 
(i.e., compensatory) would be excluded in cases 
of both physical and nonphysical injury. 
The Supreme Court construed the amendment as 
having both an inclusionary and an exclusionary direc-
tion. By stating the rule as allowing an exclusion for 
punitive damages only when there was ci :ohysical in-
jury, the Court adopted the view that the amendment 
allows an exclusion for a physical injury and denies an 
exclusion for a nonphysical injury. In fact, the language 
'Burke, note 4 supra. 
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of the amendment addresses only the circumstances in 
which there is no physical injury and makes no express 
statement concerning the treatment of damages when 
a physical injury is present. The Court did not analyze 
the amendment; it simply assumed that the denial of 
an exclusion for nonphysical injuries amounted to al-
lowing one for physical injuries. The statement was 
made by the Court in the middle of a lengthy footnote 
that dealt with the question of whether compensatory 
damages for nonphysical injuries are excluded from 
income by section 104(a)(2). The Court's comment con-
cerning the amendment's authorization of an exclusion 
of punitive damages when there was a physical injury 
is dictum and does not appear to be the product of any 
serious thought, much less a consideration of the legis-
lative history. }lor the point that the Court made in that 
footnote ~i.e., that the amendment's precluding an ex-
clusion when the injury is nonphysical supposedly 
shows that section 104(a)(2) otherwise applies to com-
pensatory damages for nonphysical injuries), it makes 
no difference whether the amendment permits an ex-
clusion for punitive damages when a physical injury 
is present. There was no reason for the Court to focus 
on the question of the applicability of the amendment 
to physical injury claims, and it does not appear to have 
done so. The Court's remarks concerning the applica-
tion of the amendment to physical injury cases appear 
to be the product of a casual reading of the statute and 
are not worthy of any weight. 
Several courts have referred to the 
Supreme Court's statement In Burke 
as support for the view that the 1989 
amendment a/lows for the exclusion of 
punitive damages In cases Involving 
physics/Injuries. 
Nevertheless, several courts have referred to the 
Supreme Court's statement in Burke as support for the 
view that the 1989 amendment allows for the exclusion 
of punitive damages in cases involving physical in-
juries. For example, the Supreme Court's comment on 
the amendment was cited with approval by the Sixth 
Circuit in its affirmance of the Tax Court's decision that 
punitive damages are excluded from income by section 
104(a}(2).:r In addition, at least two commentators con-
cluded that the amendment implicitly permits the ex-
clusion of punitive damages received after 1989 in a 
case involving physical injuries~8 Let us now consider 
whether those conclusions are warranted. 
7Horton v. Commissioner, __ F.3d __ (6th Cir. 1994) 
(divided decision). The Supreme Court's statement also was 
quoted by Judge Trott in his dissenting opinion in Hilwldns v. 
United States,_ R3d _(9th Cir. 1994) (divided decision). 
1David Jaeger, "Taxation of Punitive Damage Awards: The 
Continuing Controversy,n Tax Notes, Oct. S, 1992. p. 109; Ar-
thur W. Andrews, "The Taxation of Title Vll Victims After the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991," 46 Tax Lawyer 755, 766 (1993). 
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The House bill (H.R. 3299) that ultimately became the 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 contained a 
proposed amendment to section 104(a)(2). Section 11641 
of that bill would have amended section 104(a)(2) to per-
mit the exclusion of personal injwy damages only in a 
case involving physical injwy or physical sickness. The 
bill, with that provision intact, was passed by the House 
on October 5, 1989. The committee Report on that bill 
reflects that the principal focus of the House in adopting 
section 11641 was to preclude the exclusion of damages 
obtained in cases involving employment discrimination 
and defamation.9 
The Senate's bill, however, made no mention of sec-
tion 104 or the treatment of damages. The Conference 
Committee did not adopt the restriction th::.: had 
passed the House, but the Committee did adopt an 
amendment to section 104(a) that added the last sen-
tence to that provision. The amendment is set forth in 
section 7641 of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 
of 1989.10 That amendment barred the application of 
section 104(a)(2) to exclude from income punitive 
damages received in a case involving nonphysical in-
juries. If the legislative history is ignored, there are 
several possible inferences that might be drawn as to 
the purpose of including that provision in the final act. 
An examination of the legislative history removes any 
doubt as to the purpose of that provision. 
The Conference Committee reported the bill on 
November 21, 1989.11 Two months earlier, on Septem-
ber 13, 1989, the Tax Court promulgated its reviewed 
decision in Miller v. Commissioner12 in which a majority 
of that court held that punitive damages can be ex-
cluded under section 104(a)(2). The Fourth Circuit's 
reversal of the Tax Court's decision did not take place 
until almost one year later, on September 21, 1990. 
Consequently, at the time that the Conference Commit-
tee (and then the whole Congress) acted, the principal 
case on the question of the excludability of punitive 
damages was a recent Tax Court decision, in which 
only two judges dissented, holding that they are ex-
cluded. 
The Senate refused to adopt the limitation on section 
104(a)(2) that the House had passed. The Senate was 
not willing to make taxable all damages obtained for 
nonphysical injuries. At the Conference Corr.mittee, a 
compromise was reached. The Senate agreed to prevent 
the application of section 104(a)(2) to punitive damages 
received in a case involving only nonphysical injuries. 
The Senate thereby provided the supporters of the 
House bill with the assurance that there would be no 
exclusion of punitive damages in such cases. The Con-
ference Committee did not necessarily believe that 
punitive damages would be excluded in the absence of 
9H.R. Rep. No. 101-247, 101stCong., lstSess., pp.1354-1355 
(Sept. 20, 1989). 
10Pub. Law 101-239, section 7641, 103 Stat. 2379 (1989). 
"Revenue Prot1isions of Conference Agreement on HR 3299, 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, released by Senate 
Finance Committee on November 21, 1989. 
12Mil/er, note 2 supra. The taxpayer in Miller had received 
both compensatory and punitive damages in the settlement 
of a d~famation claim. 
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the amendment. They could well have intended no 
more than to assure that punitive damages will not be 
excluded when there was no physical injury, regardless 
of how the courts might otherwise resolve the question 
of the excludability of punitive damages under the 
pre-1989 version of section 104. Even if the Conference 
Committee believed that punitive damages would be 
excludable without the amendment, that would be be-
cause of the presence of a reviewed Tax Court decision 
to that effect. The committee could not know that that 
decision would be reversed on appeal 
There is no indication that the committee, or Con-
gress as a whole, desired that punitive damages be 
excluded when there was a physical injury. To the con-
trary, the history of the forms that the bill took as it 
passed through the legislative process makes it abun-
dantly clear that Congress deliberately chose not to 
pass on that issue and instead chose to leave that ques-
tion to be resolved by the courts. 
The bill (H.R. 3299) that the Conference Committee 
I't'ported on November 21, 1989, contains inked changes 
in the printed copy of the bill. Section 7641 of that bill 
conta:ns the amendment to section 104(a). Four words of 
the printed copy of section 7641 were deleted in ink, and 
one word was added in ink.13 The altered version is the 
one that was adopted and is now part of section 104(a). 
The unaltered copy of section 7641 read as follows: 
Sec. 7641. Limitation on Section 104 Ex-
clusion. 
(a) General Rule. - Section 104(a) (relating to 
compensation for injuries or sickness) is amended 
by adding at the end thereof the following new 
sentence: "Paragraph (2) shall not apply to any 
punitive damages unless such damages are in 
connection with a case involving physical injury 
or physical sickness." 
The language of the bill was altered in ink by drawing 
a line with a deletion symbol through the words "un-
less such damages are" and by inserting in ink the 
word "not" between the words "case" and "involving." 
As altered, the amendment read, "Paragraph (2) shall 
not apply to any punitive damages in connection with 
a case not involving physical injury or physical sick-
ness." As reported by the committee, the amendment 
appeared something like this: 
"Paragraph (2) shall not apply to any punitive 
damages 
unless sueh damages are in connection with a 
case" not involving physical injury or physical 
sickness." 
1lThe Conference Committee's version of the amendment 
is set forth in DTR No. 224, Special Supplement, p. S-81 
(November 22, 1989). The inked changes are marked on the 
bill as reproduced therein. The Conference Committee's bill, 
with those inked changes shown on the bill, also is reproduced 
in a bulletin of Prentice Hall that was published at that time; 
the bulletin is titled: Revenue Provisions of the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1989 (Title Vll), and was published as 
Bulletin 47 Extra on November 28. 1989. 
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The original printed version of the amendment 
would have made both a positive and a negative state-
ment. It would have provided that punitive dam11gt:.>:> 
received in connection with a physical injury are ex-
cluded from income and that pun!.tive damage& that 
are not connected with~ physical injury are included 
in income. The handwritten alteration that was made 
on the printed text changed the provision to make only 
a negative statement; it provides that p1;.nitive damages 
that are not connected with a physical injury are not 
excluded from income by section 104. 
Congress did not inadvertently fail to makP. an ex-
plicit statement th.at punitivt? damages connected with 
a physical injury are exclud.!d. To the contrar}~ when 
the draft contained that statement, Congress de!!ber-
ately deleted it so a:; not to take a position on that issue. 
It is clear, then, that the 1989 amendment has no bear-
ing on thE' question of the excludability of punitive 
damages that iil'e connected w_!h a physical injury. 
I It Is clear that the 1989 emendment has no bearing on the question of the excludablllty of punitive damageN that are connected wlth a physical injury. 
A second issue is whether the adoption of the 1989 
amendment implies that Congress believed that section 
104(a)(2), as it existed before the amendment, excluded 
punitive damages from income. As shown above, it is 
by no means c.lear that Congress believed that section 
104(a)(2) applied to punitive damages. Congress may 
have merely wished to asi,,ue that the court'> would 
not apply the exclusion when nonphysical injuries are 
involved. At the time that Congress acted, the Miller 
case had been decided by the Tax Court.H With cmly 
two judges dissenting, the court had held. that p.,. titive 
damages are excluded by section 104(a)(2). While the 
Tax Court's decision was reversed a year later, Con-
gress woulc! at least have believed that the .::ourts might 
follow the Tax Court's lead and holrl that punitive 
damages are excluded from income. On the other hand, 
the courts might not adopt the Tax Court ·s view. Con-
gre:;s chose to take a position on that issue only as it 
relato:?s ttJ punith·e damages that are received when 
14Miller. note 2 supra. 
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there a1e no phy.;icaJ injuries. It is highly unlilcely that 
Congress deliberately struck from the bill lll'Y reference 
to punitive damages acquired in connection with a 
.~hysicaJ injury claim because it considered that issue 
settled and wished to avoid a redundancy. It is far more 
likely that Congress, having more pressing matters 
before it, ~hose not to deal with that issue and leave it 
for the courts to resolve. 
Even if, ilt 1989, Congress did believe that punitive 
damages are excluded by section 104(3)(2), that belief 
would have little or no significance. ln the discussion 
of this issue in Hawkins, the Ninth Circuit quoted the 
Sup:-eme Court's stl'ttement that "the views of a sub-
sequent Congress fotm a hazardous basis for inferring 
the intent o! an earlier one."15 That is especially true 
here, since there is every reason to doubt that Congress 
held tha! opinion. 
In sum, the 1989 amendment sheds no light on 
whether punitive damages received pr:or to that year 
are excluded from income or on whether punitive 
damages received after that year in connection with a 
physical injury are excluded. 
One more question needs to be discussed. The last 
sentence of section 104{a) refers to "physical injury or 
physical sickness." If th"' victim of a dignitary tort has 
a mental breakdown as a consequence of •he humilia-
tion he suffered, could purtitive damages .. cquired be-
cause of that tort be excluded from income by section 
104(a)(2) because the victim incurred a "physical sick-
ness"? Jn such a case, the injury inflkted by the 
wrongdoer would not he physical, but one of the con-
sequences of that injury would be a physical reaction. 
Given the legislative history of the 1989 amendment, 
it S<!ems t.'lat Congress intended to bar the exclusion of 
punitive damages when the ~crt itr.elf did not constitute 
a physical intrusion to the person of the injured party. 
The principal focus of the 1989 House bill was to 
prevent the exclusion of damages received in dis-
crimination and def?mation cases. The final bill was a 
compromise that limited that bar to punitive damages 
received in such cases. The purpose of the amendment 
would be frustrated ii the exclusion were extended to 
pur.1tive damages received in connection with dis-
criminativn and defamation cases when the victim be-
came ill as a cvnsequence of the wrongful act. 
15Hawkins v. United States, __ F.3d __ (9th Cir. 1994) 
(divided decision), quoting from United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 
304, 313 (1961). 
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